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ABSTRACT Turkish foreign policy has changed substantially within the last de-
cade. Even though its relationship with the West still has significance, rela-
tions with neighboring countries and other countries in Africa, the Middle 
East, and Asia have improved. This new foreign policy incorporates Tur-
key’s political and economic aspirations. Its aim is to utilize the country’s 
economic strength in order to reach political goals while simultaneous-
ly using political tools to obtain economic benefits. This study analyzes 
the effects of the recent change in foreign policy on Turkey’s international 
trade. Specifically, we investigate the influence of Turkish Prime Minister 
Erdoğan’s foreign visits on international trade by using a standard trade 
gravity model. Statistical analyses imply that Erdoğan’s visits help increase 
Turkish international trade.
Economic interests have always been one of the most important elements of foreign policy. In today’s globalizing world, the significance of eco-nomic relations in foreign policy has increased even more, and the suc-
cess of specific foreign policies is now measured by their economic impact. 
International trade has become the leading factor in international policy mak-
ing, especially since the Cold War. In recent decades, policy makers of both 
developed and developing countries have been able to appreciate the mutual 
benefits of international trade to importing and exporting countries. In ad-
dition, the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and oth-
er developments in international law have liberalized and greatly reduced the 
barriers to international trade, thus increasing its volume and importance. 
By contrast, after the foundation of the Republic in the 1920s, security concerns 
were the focus of Turkey’s foreign policies. The decision-makers gave priority 
to policies that would strengthen the regime and reinforce the reforms. Turkish 
foreign policy continued to follow this approach even long after the establish-
ment of the Republic. However, after the Cold War, Turkey became much more 
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open to broad structural changes in its foreign policy framework. With Turgut 
Özal’s new government in the 1980s, Turkey started to put economic interests 
at the forefront of its foreign policy decisions. Özal decided to reshape foreign 
policy in Turkey when the country could only pay for its petrol import with its 
export revenues. His primary concern was to ensure Turkey’s productivity, and 
then establish a country that could sell its products in the world market. Özal, 
who could read the signs of globalization very well, knew that Turkey had to 
cover a large distance to meet these goals, and he prioritized trade development 
by first improving relations with neighboring countries. Özal’s foreign policy 
was an “instrument of development” model based on exports. He wanted to 
undo economy policies based on import substitution, and continued global 
initiative policies by opening up re-
lations with the Soviet Union. Pre-
ferring an aesthetic and pragmatic 
foreign policy, Özal established 
the Black Sea Economic Coopera-
tion Organization with the region’s 
countries after the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, and also showed 
interest in the republics of Middle 
Asia. By expanding the trade vol-
ume mutually with neighbors in the 
region, Özal defended the view that 
regional conflicts could be solved easily and with lower risks. He emphasized 
that to be a regional power, it is necessary to have a strong economy and sub-
stantial economic relationships, and he attempted to reach these goals through 
regional peace. As can be seen, most of the successful foreign and economic 
policies that are on the agenda of the Justice and Development party (the AK 
Party) were also on Özal’s agenda. This kind of change prevents a nation’s for-
eign policy from remaining too restricted.In order to be a more effective state 
in its region, Turkey has started to follow a relatively more independent and 
multidimensional foreign policy by putting more emphasis on bilateral rela-
tionships. However, even though there is great support for the new Turkish 
foreign policy, there are also critics who claim that Turkey is making an “axis 
shift” toward the East, and that the policy makers are driven by neo-Otto-
manism rather than by Turkish national interests.1 But approaches based on 
identity like Islamist preferences and ideological definitions are insufficient in 
explaining the present situation and can be deceptive. With the phrase “order 
establishing country in Ottoman geography,” Ahmet Davutoğlu refers to the 
transformation of those countries into stabilized and competitive polities; and 
though he objects to the ideological concept of “neo-Ottomanism”.2
Turkey’s economy is becoming increasingly dynamic, as shown by an increase 
in foreign visits from decision makers and top-level leaders, as well as an in-
Turkey’s new regional role 
cannot be explained only 
by the identity preferences 
of the AK Party; instead, an 
“interest-based” approach with 
a perspective of economic and 
geopolitical acquisitions is 
relevant here
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crease in competition over shares in regional and world markets between 
Turkish investors and industrialists. Under this new and active foreign policy, 
the international trade of Turkey has increased significantly in the relevant 
period. Turkey’s total international trade volume increased from $72 billion 
in 2001 to $389 billion in 2012.3 In this study, the interaction between Turkish 
foreign policy and international trade is analyzed. It is argued that as in many 
other modern countries, an important dimension of the new Turkish foreign 
policy is that of economic benefits to the country. It is shown that this new 
foreign policy has benefited Turkey economically; specifically, the positive ef-
fects of diplomatic activities on international trade are estimated by using a 
standard trade gravity model. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Background information is given 
about Turkish foreign policy and the changes in its structure during the AK 
Party governments. Then a brief literature review and the empirical methodol-
ogy is presented, followed by a discussion of the results. 
New Turkish Foreign Policy
Turkey’s new regional role embodied by Ankara, cannot be explained only by 
the identity preferences of the AK Party; instead, an “interest-based” approach 
with a perspective of economic and geopolitical acquisitions is relevant here. 
After Turkey gained the legal status of full membership in the EU, its economy 
began to be defined as safe and consistent, with the ability to make investments. 
Ankara, which prefers a rational foreign policy in parallel with identity-based 
approaches, started to form a foreign policy that gradually adopted the con-
cept of a “trade state.”4 The AK Party, which came into power with great hopes 
after the economic crisis of 2001, focused on rational preferences, as it knew it 
would be impossible to sustain economic success using identity politics. 
The AK Party shaped Turkish foreign policy with these rational goals in mind 
as well as the new paradigms of EU policies, emphasized above. The new for-
eign policy preferences of Ankara, aimed at establishing unproblematic rela-
tionships with peripheral countries, have always been economic benefits. Tur-
key accepted the dialogue with peripheral countries as a driving force for its 
economy, security policy and new image, and removed foreign policy from its 
priorities. By abolishing visas with most Middle East countries, Turkey’s aim 
was to influence the culture of Arabic society while concurrently increasing 
foreign trade volume .
Because of the Islamist background of the AK Party government, there are 
analyses that interpret these preferences as idealist as well as analyses that pri-
oritize economic rationality – which is the focus of this article. 
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Why does Turkey prefer an active foreign policy? Does the Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, which added ‘success in foreign trade’ to its performance crite-
ria, use foreign policy as an instrument to increase trade? Are trust-based pol-
icy preferences reflected positively in Ankara’s tourism and export volumes? 
Apart from its Western identity, Turkey discovers new markets with the help of 
the relationships it establishes through its Muslim counterparts; and in these 
new markets, it finds new zones of influence and bilateral relations. Interna-
tional trade is one of the leading instruments of Turkish foreign policy. This is 
not merely an incidental issue; it forms a new platform that accelerates bilat-
eral relations on a real political field. Increasing mutual dependence through 
trade has enabled Turkey to establish more predictable and sustainable rela-
tions with other countries.5 
The biggest risk that threatens this new and major preference of Turkish for-
eign policy is the presence of many regional conflicts in the Middle East and 
African countries. Parallel to these risks, Turkey’s industrial substructure is 
quite weak, while the industrial and economic substructure of China – its ri-
val in regions such as the Middle East and Africa – is developed and strong; 
this leads to many discussions and doubts about when and how much Turkey 
should rely on foreign trade. For Turkey to be able to exist in the asymmetric 
competition of the region, the status of a trade state should be widely accepted, 
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Given this environment, western neighbors of Tur-
key will face numerous problems due to financial 
crises, while the eastern neighbors will face prob-
lems due to political instabilities. These problems 
will not be solved in the near future in Europe or 
the Arabic world, either. This can mean a shrinking 
of the market for a productive economy. Security is-
sues caused by the movement of political fault lines 
are as much a threat for Ankara as losing markets. 
Thus, Ankara turning to Africa as an alternative 
market, can be evaluated as a consequence of rising 
conflicts in the Middle East. 
However, the 2001-10 governments have followed a 
proactive diplomacy. Being at the center of its region 
requires Turkey to balance both South-North and East-West relations. As a ne-
cessity of proactive diplomacy, it is indispensable for Turkey to establish close 
relationships with all the countries in the region. Turkey started to demon-
strate an interest in events in the region by pushing variety of foreign policy 
instruments through diplomatic processes.6 By focusing on past competitors 
such as Russia, Greece, Armenia, Iran, Iraq and Syria, Ankara has replaced the 
Cold War strategy of static polarization and regional isolation with a multidi-
mensional foreign policy, embracing the new role of regional leadership. 
The principle of good neighborly relations began before the AK Party came 
to power. For instance, relations with Greece had already been easing due to 
mutual aid attempts after earthquakes hit both countries in 1999. However, the 
support of the Annan Plan in Cyprus was the result of the new foreign policy 
of the AK Party. Turkey also exerted considerable effort to bring about more 
normalized relations with Armenia. Moreover, in spite of international politi-
cal criticism and UN sanctions, Turkey enjoys a positive relationship with Iran. 
Similarly, relations with Iraq (not only the Central Government but also the 
Regional Kurdish Government) have improved. A democratized Middle East 
means more predictable neighbor relations, long-term investment plans, and 
an expansion in the scope of regional cooperation projects for Turkey.7 
In terms of foreign policy, Turkey has made the largest investment in Syria, ac-
cepting the country as a significant market and route for both security policies 
and foreign trade. With the Arab awakening, Turkey has distanced itself from 
the Assad regime; but because of this, the foreign trade volume of Turkey has 
decreased in many Arab countries that are reached by land. Parallel to these 
positive political relationships that emerged before the Arab Spring, economic 
ties with neighboring countries have also improved. Even if we exclude energy 
imports, the growth in trade (exports as well as imports) with neighboring 
In 2001, EU and North 
American countries 
were making 60 percent 
of the total Turkish 
international trade 
volume; that ratio 
decreased to 44 percent 
in 2012
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states is remarkable. This alone suggests that Turkey’s “zero problem” policy 
has created some economic benefits. 
Another distinctive point of the AK Party’s foreign policy is the attempt to 
abandon the single-axle concept, which is more accepted in the West. Even 
though Turkey’s relationship with the West remains important, the strength 
of Turkey’s relationships with neighboring countries and other countries in 
Africa, the Middle East and Asia has increased. According to Davutoğlu, Tur-
key currently has an opportunity to redefine its position in “Afro-Eurasia” as a 
geopolitically important country. 
He presents this vision in his book Strategic Depth: 
“Turkey is a country at the epicenter of the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Cauca-
sus, the center of Eurasia in general and is in the middle of the Rimland belt cutting 
across the Mediterranean to the Pacific.”
The AK Party’s policy makers argue that rather than being peripheral, Turkey 
is a central international player and a regional power. Turkey has attempted to 
gain observer status to organizations such as Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), the U.N. Security Council, the 
African Union and the Shanghai Cooperation Orga-
nization. Regions that were regarded as distant and 
irrelevant before the AK Party governments are now 
considered hotspots. A large area from Africa to Far 
Asia and Latin America is included in the sphere of 
interest of new foreign policy. Moreover, in purely 
economic terms, the axis is rapidly shifting toward 
developing countries. While the economic weight of 
industrialized countries such as the United States, 
Japan, Germany, England, Canada, France, Italy and 
Belgium is decreasing, developing countries such as 
China, India, South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and 
Malaysia, are becoming bigger players in the world 
economy. As a result, a five-polar (at least) world is forming. Taking into ac-
count this new balance of economic power, Turkey’s newly constructed foreign 
policy and its regional involvement have expanded the economic horizons or 
Ankara. 
Looking at the international trade flows of Turkey, the consequences of these 
connections with non-Western countries can easily be identified. Table 1 pres-
ents the trade data of Turkey with different country groups and how it changed 
between 2001-2012. In 2001, EU and North American countries were making 
60 percent of the total Turkish international trade volume; that ratio decreased 
Casual observation 
suggests that trade 
volume has increased 
more with those 
countries where 
Turkish foreign 
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to 44 percent in 2012. Similarly, countries within the Organization of Econom-
ic Co-operation and Development (OECD) saw trade decrease from 66 per-
cent to 46 percent. (Note: most EU countries are also members of OECD.) On 
the other hand, the share of Asian, Near and Middle East countries, members 
of Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and Organization of the Islamic Con-
ference has increased substantially. We observe a 20 to 30 percent increase 
- in some countries, it’s even close to 50 percent - in annual trade volume. Al-
though those growth rates cannot continue indefinitely, they are nevertheless 
related to Turkey’s new foreign policy. 
However, Ankara’s attempt at multidimensional foreign policy is not as simple 
as it looks, especially when conflicts of interests are taken into consideration. 
On the one hand, Turkey tries to balance between the EU-United States and 
the Middle East-Eurasia; on the other, it searches for harmony between the 
North and the South, and the policies that give importance to both Russia 
and Africa involve risks. Thus, multidimensional foreign policy generates new 
rivalries in different centers and involves new risks5. While some experts con-
sider Turkey’s new foreign policy to be a proactive expansion, others accuse of 
Davutoğlu of being unrealistic and irrational. They interpret the policy con-
ducted by Davutoglu to be neo-Ottomanist. 
As the data in Table 1 clearly shows, not only has trade with geographically 
close countries like Iran, Lebanon and Israel increased during the last decade, 
but so too has trade with other Asian, African, European, and Muslim coun-
tries. Casual observation suggests that trade volume has increased more with 
those countries where Turkish foreign policy makers have developed greater 
interactions. Specifically, we observe that trade has increased with the countries 
where the Prime Minister, President and Ministry of State have made frequent 
visits. It shows that the new foreign policy has generated positive economic re-
sults. In the next section we will statistically test the hypothesis that Turkish for-
eign policy activities have indeed had a beneficial impact on the country’s trade.
Data and Methodology
In order to understand the influence of diplomatic activities on the interna-
tional trade of Turkey, we use a standard gravity model. This framework pre-
dicts the trade flows between two countries by their economic sizes and geo-
graphic distances between them. The model, first proposed by Jan Tibergen 
(1962)8, has been used frequently in empirical trade flow studies. The under-
lying concept is simple and attractive: bigger countries (per capita income and 
population) trade more, and the further away from each other the higher the 
costs of trade, and thus, the lower the trade flow. The basic model is defined 
by the following formula, which is similar to the Newtonian gravity equation:
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[(Size]i [ ) (Size]j)Tradeij = Distanceij
Where 
Tradeij : The trade flow between countries i and j,
Sizei : The economic size of country i,
Sizej : The economic size of country j,
Distanceij : The geographic distance between countries i and j.
There have been many theoretical justifications and adjustments to the ba-
sic model. Alan Deardoff (1998)9 provided a good theoretical assessment of 
the model and concluded that a gravity specification is consistent with many 
types of trade models. Generally, it has been observed that the gravity model 
is indeed a good predictor of bilateral trade flows. Later empirical studies add-
ed many other variables to the basic gravity model, such as the existence of 
common borders, language, currency and colonial links. Those additional ex-
planatory variables both improve the predictive power of the model and help 
to clarify the impact of specific factors on trade. However, since the goal of this 
paper is not to accurately describe all factors affecting trade between Turkey 
and other countries, the gravity model is kept as simple as possible and only 
the most basic explanatory variables are used. Keeping the model simple al-
lows us to use almost all countries in this statistical analysis, since the required 
income and population data are available for virtually all countries.
Thus we estimate the following panel gravity equation:10
[(TRD]it) = β0 + β1 [(Y]Tt) + β2 [(Y]it) + β3 [(Pop]Tt) + β4 [(Pop]it) + β5 (Dit) + εit (1)
[(MPRT]it) = β0 + β1 [(Y]Tt) + β2 [(Y]it) + β3 [(Pop]Tt) + β4 [(Pop]it) + β5 (Dit) + εit (2)
[(XPRT]it) = β0 + β1 [(Y]Tt) + β2 [(Y]it) + β3 [(Pop]Tt) + β4 [(Pop]it) + β5 (Dit) + εit (3)
Where
TRDit : The total trade between country i and Turkey in year t,
XPRTit : The export of Turkey to country i in year t,
MPRTit : The import of Turkey from country i in year t,
YTt : The real income per capita in Turkey in year t,
Yit : The real income per capita in country i in year t,
PopTt : The population of Turkey in year t,
Popit : The population of country i in year t,
DiT : The geographical distance between country i and Turkey.
The aim of this study is to understand the influence of diplomatic activities 
of the government on Turkey’s international trade. Therefore, the diplomatic 
activities of the government in these estimations could be included. A positive 
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coefficient would represent a positive relationship between diplomatic activ-
ities and international trade. However, if the government concentrates on its 
diplomatic activities in those countries where there are already strong trade 
links, we would see a positive relationship between trade volume and diplo-
matic activities. This is the typical question of whether there is causation or 
mere correlation between two events – which causes what? Do diplomatic mis-
sions cause more trade, or does trade cause an increase in diplomatic missions? 
As stated before, endogeneity can be a serious problem in econometric analy-
sis. There are two possible ways to handle this problem: IV-estimation and the 
differences-in-differences (diff-diff) method. Since it is difficult to find a strong 
instrumental variable, the diff-diff method is more common than IV. Also, the 
diff-diff method is used mostly for panel data while IV is used for cross-sec-
tional data. Andrew Rose (2007)11 uses IV to overcome the causality problem 
in cross-sectional data for whether foreign missions are in fact systematical-
ly linked to exports or not. He links exports from 22 important countries to 
200 destination countries and uses data averaged between 2002-03. On the 
other hand, Volker Nitsch (2007)12 studies whether visits from heads of state 
from France, Germany and the U.S. from1948-2003 promoted exports. Nitsch 
applies a long-run differences-in-differences specification. Specifically, he re-
gresses the annual growth rates of 
bilateral exports on a dummy vari-
able that takes the value of 1 when 
a country in his sample has ever re-
ceived an official visit from the ex-
porting nation, and another dum-
my that is equal to 1 when an actual 
visit has taken place. The method 
used in this paper, explained below, 
is similar. What we do is regress dif-
ferences between actual trade and predicted trade by the number of visitations. 
In this aspect, it operates like the diff-diff method.
To analyze the possible effects of diplomatic missions on trade, we use a simple 
two-step strategy. In the first step, we estimate a standard gravity trade model 
using the Equations 1-3. In these estimations, we use the annual international 
trade data of Turkey with more than 150 countries in the years of 1998, 1999 
and 2000. By using these estimation results we predict the trade of Turkey with 
other countries in 2008. We compare those predicted values with the actual 
trade volume in 2008. Then, we look at whether there is any relationship be-
tween diplomatic missions in the related period and any unpredicted increase 
in the trade volume. Essentially, we simulate trade between Turkey and the rel-
evant country in 2008, assuming that only per-capita incomes and populations 
of these two countries changed after 2001. Obviously many other things have 
Our hypothesis is that if more 
diplomatic missions occurred 
between Turkey and any 
country, we should expect a 
higher increase in trade with 
that country
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changed in the relevant period; but 
the one thing we are interested in is 
the diplomatic missions. Our hy-
pothesis is that if more diplomatic 
missions occurred between Turkey 
and any country, we should expect 
a higher increase in trade with that 
country. In other words, the actual 
change in the trade volume would 
be higher than the expected change 
due to the increase in income and 
population of Turkey and the oth-
er country. In short, a positive re-
lationship between the residual of 
actual and predicted values of trade volume and diplomatic missions can be 
loosely interpreted as diplomatic missions helping (and thus, causing) the in-
crease in international trade. The standard gravity model explains the trade 
volume between two countries by the incomes and populations of two trading 
countries and the distance between them. Therefore, we expect the trade vol-
ume between Turkey and other countries to have increased from 2001 to 2008, 
since the populations and incomes of both Turkey and the trading partner 
countries increased. However, if the diplomatic missions of the Prime Minis-
ter were successful in encouraging trade, the actual increase in trade volume 
would have been bigger than the rise in trade volume because of the rise in 
income and population. In order to test this hypothesis we estimated the fol-
lowing equations.
UTRDDi = β1 + β2DMi + εi  (4)
UMPRTDi = β1 + β2DMi + εi  (5)
UXPRTDi = β1 + β2DMi + εi  (6)
Where 
UTRDDi : The difference between actual trade between Turkey and country i and 
predicted trade between Turkey and country i in 2008, 
UMPRTi : The difference between actual imports of Turkey from country i and 
predicted imports of Turkey from country i in 2008, 
UXPRTi : The difference between actual exports of Turkey to country i and pre-
dicted exports of Turkey to country i in 2008,
DMi : The number of formal visitations of the Prime Minister of Turkey (Re-
cep Tayyip Erdogan) to country i between 2003 and 2008.
A positive β2 coefficient can be interpreted as the fact that diplomatic visi-
tations from Turkish officials (the Prime Minister in this case) increase the 
A positive relationship 
between the residual of 
actual and predicted values of 
trade volume and diplomatic 
missions can be loosely 
interpreted as diplomatic 
missions helping (and thus, 
causing) the increase in 
international trade
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trade between two countries. Obviously many other government officials, 
including the President of the Republic, the Minister of Trade, other minis-
ters and lower-level public officials, also make formal visitations to the other 
countries. Naturally those visitations also have an effect on trade. However, 
categorizing and weighting the different officials’ formal visitations would re-
quire a lot more data and some ad hoc assumptions, so we use only the Prime 
Minister’s visitations. In fact we can presume that the visitations of the Prime 
Minister and other public officials are highly correlated. We obtained data on 
formal visitations from the Prime Minister’s General Office through private 
communication. Income and population data were obtained from The World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators Database. Export and import data were 
obtained from the Turkish Statistical Office’s (TUIK) website.3 The distances 
between Turkey and other trading partner countries were obtained from data 
software EU Gene version 3.204 by Bennett Scott and Stam Allan.13 
Results and Discussion
Table 2 presents the estimation results of Equations 1-3 using data from 1998-
2000. We omitted the 2001 and 2002 data in our estimations to avoid the dis-
tortionary effects of the 2001 financial crisis. On the other hand, we do not 
want to go too far from today in our estimations, as we rely on the presump-
tion that the Turkish economy and global economy are not too different today 
than in the years on which we do our estimations. By using these three years of 
data we have a relatively reasonable number of observations (between 414 and 
445 on different specifications) in the estimations. 
All coefficients on the estimations have the expected signs and almost all of 
them are statistically significant at conventional levels. In column 1, the es-
timation results of Equation 1 are presented. Here the dependent variable is 
total trade between Turkey and the other country. The positive sign on the 
coefficient of Turkish per capita income variable means that as the per capi-
ta income in Turkey increases the total trade between Turkey and the other 
country rises. 
The estimated elasticity is presented in brackets. Elasticity is a measurement 
that indicates the changes in one variable in response to a change in another 
variable. In this case elasticity is defined as:
ΔYTt
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Elasticities with respect to other variables are calculated similarly. A coefficient 
of 3.9 in the first row of the first column indicates that a 10 percent increase 
in the per capita income of Turkey increases the trade volume by 39 percent. 
Similarly, an increase in the per capita income of the corresponding country 
increases the total trade between Turkey and the other country. The popula-
tions of both countries (Turkey and its trading partner) also positively affect 
the trade volume between them. Similar to other studies on the subject, we 
also find a negative relationship between trade volume and geographical dis-
tance. If a country is 10 percent farther away from Turkey than another coun-
try, ceteris paribus, its total trade with Turkey is 7.9 percent less than the other 
one. There could be many explanations for that negative effect of distance, but 
the most basic and significant one is that transportation and communication 
costs are higher for faraway places. 
In the second column, the dependent variable is the import of Turkey from 
the other country.14 Similar to total trade estimation, all coefficients have the 
expected signs and they are all significant. The third column presents the es-
timation results of Equation 3, where the dependent variable is the export of 
Turkey to the other country. In this estimation many coefficients are insignif-
icant, though they have the “correct” sign. Turkish per capita and the popu-
lation values do not seem to be affecting the exports of Turkey to the other 
country. That result is not surprising, since we do not expect those variables to 
be very important for Turkish exports to the other country. The other country’s 
per capita income and population are more important explanatory variables.
Table 3 presents our main estimations. In this table, the dependent variable is 
the unexplained increase in trade between Turkey and other countries. The de-
pendent variable in the first column is the trade (due to the change in the in-
come and population) between Turkey and the other country from 2001-08. The 
explanatory variable is the number of formal visitations of the Turkish Prime 
Minister Erdoğan to each country from 2003-08. We use the total number of 
visitations in that period since we presume that it is very unlikely that diplomat-
ic visitations would increase trade immediately. It will take time to launch and 
increase the trade, so there will be latency. There is no theoretical basis to choose 
a specific latency period, and there is not enough empirical data to choose a la-
tency period by using quantitative methods, either. Hence, we choose to analyze 
the cumulative effect of diplomatic visitations on the trade in 2008. 
 
The positive coefficient on the diplomacy variable suggests that there is a very 
strong and positive relationship between the Prime Minister’s visits and an 
increase in the trade. Since the dependent variable is the unexplained increase 
in trade due to the change in standard gravity model explanatory variables, 
there is no straightforward interpretation of the coefficient. It tells us that a 10 
percent increase in the formal visitations of the Prime Minister would increase 
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the trade by 21 percent, if there is no other change in the factors affecting the 
trade. According to that estimation, the Prime Minister’s visits are highly ef-
fective in promoting trade relations. The second and third columns of Table 
3 suggest that international visits of the Prime Minister increase both the im-
ports and exports of Turkey.
Conclusion
During the Cold War, Turkey had practically no room for practicing its own 
independent foreign policy, since it was a member of NATO. Turkey had 
developed a concept of foreign policy and security in a bipolar world, and 
believed for years that its importance derived solely from its geopolitical po-
sition. Changing regional and global circumstances are now providing new 
opportunities for Ankara. Thus, experimentation with different foreign policy 
approaches should be expected. 
Turkey has thus turned into a country that can make flexible political decisions 
for its own benefit in the world and the region. Emiliano Alessandri (2010) 
expresses this perspective in following statement:
“Turkey, it is stressed, has in recent years come to adopt a soft-power as opposed to 
a hard-power approach to foreign policy. Economic opportunity and peace have be-
come the driving forces of its external action, allowing Turkey to greatly expand its 
trading relations and to act as facilitator of dialogue in such realms as the Caucasus 
and the Arab-Israeli peace process. To European countries subscribing to this view, 
Turkey’s activism in the Middle East is nothing to be afraid of. It is, on the contrary, a 
clear demonstration that Turkey would be a critical ‘asset’ for the EU15.”
The new foreign policy concept involves close interaction between the political 
and economic aspirations of Turkey. Its aim is to utilize its economic strength 
in order to reach political goals, while concurrently using political tools to ob-
tain economic benefits. However, when Turkey’s economic and military capac-
ities are critically assessed, it is obvious that they are not sufficient for Turkey 
to meet its very ambitious political goals. The relatively ineffective role played 
by Turkey in the latest Middle East crisis has only made that point clearer. On 
the other hand, Turkey’s somewhat reluctant attitude toward the latest crisis 
in Libya may be attributed to economic ties that sometimes become barriers, 
rather than instruments in political processes. 
Is the new foreign policy associated with Davutoğlu a sustainable concept? 
Whether or not the same line of new foreign policy can be maintained under 
a different government is a question that can only be answered in time. Yet, 
very fast and significant changes in the region show that Turkey cannot afford 
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to be closed to regional and global progress. It can be argued that peace, de-
mocratization, and the maintenance of economic stability will bear positive 
results not only for its own subjects, but for other countries in the region and 
for international security. 
When we analyze Turkish foreign policy from a perspective that takes into 
account its historical roots, we see that sometimes an interest-seeking foreign 
policy has been dominant while at other times a value-based foreign policy has 
emerged. Even if Turkey seems to have developed a new foreign policy line in 
which certain values are in the foreground, it can’t be claimed that these values 
are distinct from Turkey’s interests. Turkey, as the only liberal, democratic, 
secular and Muslim country in the region, will be active in the Middle East.16 
The increasing interest of Turkish foreign policy in Muslim areas, and especial-
ly in the Middle East, should not be perceived as an opposition to traditional 
Western-oriented foreign policy; nor should it be described as an “axis shift” or 
as “neo-Ottomanism.” A stable Middle East in the process of democratization 
and normalization presents Turkey with a golden opportunity for better secu-
rity and improved economy policies. 
 2001 2012
    % to    % to 
     Total Export Import Trade Total
 Export Import Trade Trade Export Import Trade Trade
Country Groups (Million $) (Million $) (Million $) (%) (Million $) (Million $) (Million $) (%)
EU (27 Countries) 17,546 19,823 37,369 51 59,201 87,447 146,648 38
Other Europe 2095 5738 7833 11 14,368 37,416 51,784 13
Africa 1521 2819 4340 6 10,357 5922 16,279 4
North America 3297 3390 6688 9 6662 15,084 21,746 6
Central America 201 41 242 0 769 1069 1838 0
South America 186 410 596 1 2191 4079 6270 2
Near and Middle East 3261 3016 6278 9 42,452 21,410 63,862 18
Other Asia 1331 4884 6216 9 10,575 49,601 60,176 15
OECD 21,307 26,886 48,193 66 66,293 113,723 18,016 46
Black Sea Economic
Cooperation 
Organization 2932 5553 8486 12 18,793 41,509 60,302 16
Commonwealth of
Independent States 1978 4630 6608 9 15,075 35,248 50,323 13
Organization of the
Islamic Conference 4197 5540 9736 13 55,220 31,690 86,910 22
Total 31,334 41,399 72,733 1 152,469 236,545 333,991 1
Table 1. The Change in Trade Structure of Turkey between 2001 and 20123.
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Table 2. International Trade Gravity Model.
This table reports results from estimation of equation 1, 2 and 3 by random effects generalized least squares using heteroske-
dastic structure. The t statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. The numbers in brackets represent the elasticity values.
 Dependent Variables
 Total Trade between Imports of Exports of
 Turkey and the Turkey from the Turkey to the
 Other Country Other Country Other Country
Exogenous Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept -3.27e+9*** -3.66e+9*** 1.94e+8
 (-3.93) (-4.78) (0.57)
 [3.90] 459312.4*** [5.82]
Per capita income in Turkey 456582.6*** [0.33] 13496.2
 (3.90) (4.26) (0.50)
 [0.79] 58958.2*** [0.77]Per capita income in the other
 36040*** [0.89] 23455.4**country
 (2.99) (3.53) (2.54)
 [3.87] 27.97*** [6.61]
Population in Turkey 31.63*** [-0.67] -1.647
 (3.31) (3.59) (-0.42.)
 [0.17] 1.93** [0.17]
Population in the other Country 1.33** [0.12] 0.52
 (2.20) (2.54) (1.32)
 [-0.79] -106956.1*** [-0.69]Distance between Turkey and
 -61309.7*** [-0.88] -39642.6***the other country
 (-2,72) (-2.70) (-2.62)
# of Obs. 414 426 445
 Dependent Variables
 Difference in Difference in Difference in
 Trade between Imports of Exports of
 Turkey and the Turkey from the Turkey to
 Other Country Other Country Other Country
Exogenous Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept -8.63E+08**** -8.51e+8*** 3.36e+8***
 (-3.63) (-4.87) (3.96)
 [2.10] 1.93e+9*** [6.35]
Diplomacy 1.20e+9*** [0.63] 7.38e+8***
 (4.46) (3.97) (4.37)
R2 0.42 0.31 0.56
# of Obs. 142 144 153
Table 3. Effects of Diplomatic Visitations on Trade.
This table reports results from estimation of Equation 1 and 2 by ordinary least squares using heteroskedastic structure. The 
t statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
These are estimation results of equations 4, 5 and 6. The numbers in brackets represent the elasticity values. The dependent 
variable is the difference between the predicted value of trade in 2008 (import, export) using the coefficients from estima-
tions of equations 1-3 using 1998-2000 data and actual trade volume. 
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